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10 Changing Safety Culture in a Steel
Works
Background
By the mid 1980s the Fires Research Station that funded my studies of human
behaviour in fires decided that it had provided what was needed and that they
should not support me to do any further research. So I set about finding other ways
of developing that work. An opportunity was provided by the Insurance Technical
Bureau who wanted to measure the management contribution to risk in industrial
processes (Powell and Canter, 1985). This work did not survive the demise of that
bureau but it did open the door to British Steel, who were interested in ways of
assessing and ultimately improving the attitude of their workforce to safety.
Like many well managed British Industries, British Steel had been able to reduce
accidents considerably over a number of years by technical modifications and the
introduction of many safe working practices, but they had reached a point were
there were still a number of accidents that were impervious to these processes.
They were therefore looking for a radically different way to tackle their problems.
My colleague Henryk Olearnik and I approached this issue with a series of studies
over two years. Some key findings will illustrate how that research unfolded.
The first finding is illustrated in Figure 1. This shows correlations between one
year and the next for the accident figures for twelve different departments. As can
be seen there is a remarkable consistency in the probability of these supposedly
accidental events. By comparing the figures with expert opinions of the inherent
dangerousness of the processes in each department it was clear that these technical
variations were not a major cause of the variations in the accident figures.
Something in the 'climate' or 'culture' of the department was probably of more
significance.
To test this hypothesis attitude to safety scales were developed and the average
score on these scales for each department was correlated with their annual safety
figures. Figure 2 shows one of the remarkably strong correlations that were
consistently found between attitudes and safety performance.
These very high correlations, that get close to the reliability levels of both the
attitudinal and the safety measures, have since been repeated many times over in
many different industrial settings. However, of more significance was the particular
pattern of correlations with different aspects of attitudes and the distribution of
attitude scores or every particular department. For it was these safety climate
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Figure 1 Correlation: all accidents 1985/86 x 1986/87
profiles that provided clear directions in which management needed to proceed in
order to improve the climate for each department.
A general framework, however, in the form of an action plan was needed to tum
these rather academic ideas into something that could be implemented. The
following chapter is a copy of the first few pages of that plan. These pages appear
to have become almost a sacred text at the Teesside works where the research was
done and together with the detailed recommendations and the departmental
attitudinal profiles became a framework that was acted upon in great detail. The
resulting change accident rates surprised all of us. An example for one potentially
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Figure 2 Safety attitude scale 6: shopfloor satisfaction correlation with self
reported accidents
very dangerous department is given in Figure 3. Indeed in some departments the
target of zero lost time accidents within five years was reached within the first year
of the application of the proposals. Since that time a number of other organisations
have supported similar research with good results, although none have been quite
so dramatic as those achieved at British Steel.
The work at British Steel was greatly assisted by the one person who could have
been most threatened by it, their safety manager Peter Jamieson. Undoubtedly his
dedication and expertise contributed tremendously to the success of the whole
project. The wholehearted support given by the Managing Director of the site,
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Danny Ward, was also a crucial factor in its success.
Teeside Accident Trends
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introduced.
Figure 3 Teesside accident trends
The zero objective
At present the accident figures at Teesside are much better than some years ago,
but there is considerable room for improvement. Recommendations are made with
the intention of creating a situation in which there are no accidents within five
years.
This report summarises the results of the background research. They show clearly
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that there are consistent safety performance differences between plants at Teesside
and that these can be related directly to differences in attitudes.
From the research conducted at Teesside and other relevant studies, five
principles are presented as a basis for an action plan.
A ten point plan is then proposed that will lead to a change of attitudes and the
consequent elimination of accidents. Detailed guidance on how these actions may
be taken most successfully is provided.
Five basic principles
To change attitudes enough to eliminate accidents five broad principles should be
followed:
a. Encouragement of safe working practices to be as strong as the
discouragement of dangerous working.
b. Provision of strong support for plant level planning and accountability for
safety.
c. Emphasis on the significance of first line supervisor foremen/supervisors
in maintaining safe practices and the development of more appropriate
training and monitoring for them.
d. Utilise social processes as the means of changing attitudes to support the
exhortation of individuals.
e. Emphasise the maintenance and fostering of a good organisational climate
for safety.
A ten point plan
The principles can be turned into detailed actions following a ten point plan:
1. Continuously demonstrate commitment to positive safety.
2. Focus safety accountability.
3. Derive plant level initiatives
4. Strengthen work of the safety committees.
5. Rehabilitate lapsed safe working procedures of production as well as
engineering.
6. Improve contribution of safety representatives.
7. Develop safety training to emphasise human factors.
8. Regularly and overtly, monitor attitudes to safety and their relationship to
safety performance at plant level.
9. Establish procedures to check on and improve safety related communication
between all groups.
10. Elaborate and clarify the safety responsibilities inherent in all job
descriptions.
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An achievable objective
At present there are a great number of separate initiatives that are taken throughout
the Teesside works with regard to safety. The effectiveness of these has been
clearly demonstrated by the steady fall in the accident ratios over the past decade.
However, it is also clear that these actions are no longer very effective in having
a major impact on further improvement in the safety record. In broad terms they
now appear to be maintaining it at its present level.
A responsive organisation
A number of factors point to the possibility of achieving better safety performance.
One is the fact that earlier measures have been effective so that the organisation
as a whole clearly can respond to safety initiatives.
The second is that the attitudinal survey carried out shows widespread support for
improved safety, in principle, at all levels of the organisation. Particularly
important is the fact that senior management are obviously genuine in their
commitment to improving safety performance.
A third is that the research indicates that the very process of surveying attitudes
may have modified them and relevant behaviour, supporting the view that a more
direct process could have more significant effects.
An overaLLstrategy
A third factor that makes a considerable reduction in accidents an achievable
objective is that current safety activities do not appear to benefit form being guided
by an overall, detailed strategy. They appear to have grown up in response to many
different issues and initiatives. It therefore seems highly likely that if these can be
developed into a coherent set of actions that follow an overall strategy for safety at
Teesside a real improvement is possible. By taking into account what is now known
about the attitudinal basis of dangerous activities a dramatic improvement is
possible.
The factors indicating the possibility for improvement all point to the feasibility
of eliminating accidents at Teesside.
There is evidence that nearly all accidents are now a product of inappropriate
human behaviour at some recognisable stage in the events leading up to the
accident. Given that there are many indications that the actions of the work force
can be modified at Teesside there are strong reasons to believe that behaviour of
relevance to accidents can also be modified.
A clear objective
Making the elimination of accidents the overt objective of the overall strategy also
gives it a very clear direction. At the same time it presents as clearly as possible the
commitment of British Steel to safe working.
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Human factors not technical factors
Workers at Teesside are proud of their skills and the achievements of their industry.
They enjoy the technical challenges that their work presents and thrive on debates
about processes and products. Within this framework consideration of human
aspects of the work situation has tended to be rather limited and mechanical. There
is therefore considerable opportunity for developing a more subtle approach to the
human factors in regard to safety.
Personal contact
Many years of research on attitude change show that the strongest change processes
come from direct contact between people within the context of group support. It is
clear that there is considerable opportunity for strengthening these processes at
Teesside.
Preservation not compensation
The research indicates that accidents are generally thought of in terms of their
threat to the individual. There is also no evidence from our research that anyone
considers possible compensation claims as a reason for taking risks. The
enhancement of the awareness of the workforce of how they can reduce risks is
therefore likely to fall on fertile ground.
Beyond protection to procedures
A further reason why the zero objective is feasible is that the research has revealed
that, in general, the wearing of protective clothing is now well established at
Teesside. The correlates of accident ratios are attitudes to safety procedures. So,
by giving more emphasis to active safe working, improvements in behaviour are
possible beyond those achievable by emphasising the more passive response of just
wearing protective clothing and using safety equipment.
No magic formula
It must be emphasised that attitudes and consequent behaviour cannot be changed
by isolated actions, such as a poster campaign or beefing up training. Behavioural
change is brought about by a number of interrelated actions that form a coherent
plan. The more these actions can build upon current, worthwhile activities the more
chance they have of success.
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